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Quarterly Economic Commentary 
ECONOMIC 
Perspective 
THE IMPACT OF THE EURO ON THE 
SCOTTISH LABOUR MARKET 
- SOME POSSIBLE SCENARIOS* 
by John J Struthers, Dean of the Faculty of 
Business, University of Paisley 
INTRODUCTION 
The introduction of the EURO on 1 January 1999 
could have profound implications for the UK 
Labour Market in general and the Scottish Labour 
Market in particular. The precise ways in which 
the EURO may impact on the Scottish Labour 
Market will depend on a number of inter-related 
factors, inter alia: 
• Whether or not Sterling does eventually join 
the EURO system; 
• The extent to which Economic Convergence 
(see below) is achieved within each of the EU 
Member States; 
• The impact of Convergence (if achieved) on 
specifically labour market aspects (eg labour 
mobility, wage and non-wage costs etc); 
• The effect of the EURO in making price and 
wage differences between member states more 
transparent; and 
• The implications of other European policies 
(eg The Social Charter and Minimum Wage 
Legislation) on the Scottish Labour Market. 
1. Whether or not Sterling joins the EURO? 
This is the primary question to address. The 
delay in Sterling joining the EURO System, 
and indeed, the possibility that the currency 
" An earlier version of this paper was presented at 
the first conference of the Scottish Trade Union 
Research Network (STURN) held in Glasgow in 
June 1999. 
may never join, creates uncertainty within 
financial markets. A key gain from joining, is 
a downward drift in UK interest rates to levels 
comparable with those in the rest of Europe 
(see Table 1). This undoubtedly would be a 
gain because lower interest rates within a low-
inflation environment, will be growth-inducing 
and will stimulate investment and therefore 
employment. Of course, much of the British 
reluctance to commit to the EURO is based on 
the notion that Economic Convergence (Lower 
Public Sector Deficit Levels, Lower 
Unemployment levels etc) has to be achieved, 
or nearly achieved, before Britain finally 
commits itself to the EURO. 
We should be clear on possible directions of 
causation. It is not the EURO alone that will 
achieve convergence. Rather it will be as a 
consequence of more general macroeconomic 
factors - the so-called Economic 
Fundamentals - which will help to achieve 
Convergence. In this connection, the debate 
about the EURO can be considered as "Much 
Ado About Nothing". The exchange rate is 
after all just one of a number of price variables 
which influences the competitiveness of 
countries. Abolition of exchange rates within 
Europe certainly reduces transaction costs 
associated with trading, which should in time 
be trade-creating. 
For the UK economy, and also for the Scottish 
Economy, perhaps one of the justifiable 
reasons for caution is the heavy investment 
and trade which the UK enjoys with the US, 
the Japanese and other non-European 
economies eg Latin America, the 
Commonwealth etc. This is manifested by the 
high degree of inward investment which the 
UK Economy (and the Scottish economy in 
particular) exhibits vis-a-vis these non-EU 
partners. It could be argued that such inward 
investment has been attracted into the UK by 
an almost "Beggar My Neighbour Policy". 
Namely, Japanese, Far Eastern and US 
companies have been more inclined to invest 
in UK plant, because of the relatively high 
recent rates of economic growth within the 
UK, alongside a labour market environment 
which compared with European competitors 
has been more flexible and less constrained by 
high non-wage costs (eg social security 
provisions) - the so called Safe Haven 
argument. 
The question is whether such willingness on 
the part of these non-EU investors would be 
affected at all if Sterling joined the EURO. 
The honest answer is we do not know! 
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Providing the EURO does not bring with it 
some of the structural (Non-Convergence) 
weaknesses exhibited by our European 
neighbours, it should make no difference to 
their willingness to invest in the UK. Instead 
of the Americans, Japanese or Koreans 
exchanging their respective currencies for 
Sterling, they will exchange them for EUROS. 
They will continue to incur a transaction cost 
in this regard which they would have incurred 
against Sterling anyway. 
Therefore, on balance, whether Sterling joins 
the EURO is not the fundamental question. 
What matters more is whether the Gains to 
Trade to be derived from enhanced European 
growth, and trading opportunities are offset by 
the losses to the UK economy from reduced 
non-European trade and investment. 
Certainly, all the forecasts suggest that UK 
interest rates will continue to fall within a 
European context and this may be a substantial 
gain from EURO membership. This will have 
to be borne out in any calculus of overall 
gains and losses. 
2. Is Economic Convergence being achieved 
within Europe? 
This is a more difficult question to answer than 
we might imagine. 
The following are the main Convergence Criteria 
which EU Member States are working towards: 
• The achievement of price stability; 
• The sustainability of the government financial 
provision (Budget Deficits at no greater than 
3% of the GDP) - (Public Debt Ratio should 
not exceed 60% of GDP); 
• The durability of convergence among Member 
States as reflected in long-term interest rate 
levels. This means a downward harmonisation 
of interest rates towards the level of the most 
successful Member States; 
• Member currencies should observe the normal 
fluctuation margins provided for by the ERM 
for at least 2 years without devaluing against 
the currency of any other Member State. 
EU statistics appearing in Table 2 indicate that with 
the exception of the Budget Deficit in some 
countries, a high degree of convergence has been 
achieved particularly in relation to price inflation 
and interest rates. When we come to 
unemployment levels, however, there is significant 
disparity with the UK in an especially strong 
position at approximately 4.7%, whilst countries 
such as Spain stand at 15%. However, by January 
2000 the average European Union level of 
unemployment was 9.9% which certainly 
represents a declining trend from the level of 
January 1999 (10.6%). 
It is common knowledge that the UK Government 
has indicated a "wait and see" approach to Euro 
membership. This is based on 2 main aspects. 
Firstly, a settled or sustained period of convergence 
and; secondly an increased preparedness of the UK 
economy for the effects of a European-wide (and 
ECB co-ordinated) monetary policy with 
continually declining interest rates. The latter is as 
difficult to be certain about as the former even 
although the recent performance of the UK 
economy in terms of the "virtuous circle" of high 
economic growth accompanied by low inflation 
would indicate a higher level of preparedness of the 
UK economy than ever before. The Stability and 
Growth Pact of Member States which lies at the 
very core of this objective, at least as far as the UK 
government is concerned must be achieved 
simultaneously with falling budget deficits. It is on 
the latter aspect that the UK's position seems to be 
more solidly-based. In this connection David 
Smith (1999) in a recent article makes a valid point 
when he says ... "Paradoxically the economic 
argument for EMU may be won only if Britain's 
economy is seen to be doing less well than it is now 
.. .the public's response to a decision to join EURO 
would be .. If it ain't broke why fix it? ..." 
Further confusion and uncertainty has recently 
been added to the dilemma faced by the UK 
government from the findings of a recently 
published IMF paper which suggests that Sterling 
is significantly overvalued against the EURO 
perhaps by as much as 20%. Prior to joining the 
EURO, Sterling would have to be devalued to that 
extent giving an entry rate at 81 pence to the 
EURO, compared with the current rate of 63 pence 
to the EURO. Of course, since the EURO'S launch 
in 1999 Sterling has appreciated sharply, as has the 
US dollar. The dilemma for the UK government is 
whether it would be willing to suffer the 
inflationary effect of such a substantial currency 
devaluation on EURO entry. Or should the 
currency remain outside the EURO even if this 
means that Sterling remains high? 
UK (and Scottish ) exporters are normally unhappy 
when Sterling is overvalued as this makes then-
export markets less competitive. Ironically, and 
this complicates the picture even more, recent 
trends suggest that perhaps UK exporters are 
beginning to live with the strong pound. This was 
certainly the view expressed in the Bank of 
England's November 1999 Inflation Report which 
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indicated that the fall in the UK's export of goods 
and services experienced in 1998 (largely 
attributable to the decline in exports to East Asia,) -
was reversed at least in the second and third 
quarters of 1999. The combined total of export 
growth (including those to the US and EU 
countries) was 2.1% during that period. Surveys 
by both the CBI and the British Chambers of 
Commerce indicated that the growth in world 
demand experienced during 1999 more than offset 
the potential negative effects of Sterling's high 
value on UK exports. 
Moreover the early performance of the EURO 
since its launch in January of last year, if it persists, 
might indicate a less powerful currency than 
Member States had anticipated. Whilst it is 
premature to speak of a Euro-currency crisis, a 
possible threat to the prospect of continually falling 
interest rates would arise from a falling EURO. If 
this were to persist, it may in fact be necessary to 
raise Euro interest rates, thereby throwing away 
one of the long sought after gains of EMU. On this 
score alone, the UK Government's reticence to 
commit itself to the EURO, whilst undoubtedly 
irksome to EU neighbours is probably the wise and 
cautious approach. 
There is a fundamental cause and effect issue at the 
heart of this debate. Will Economic Convergence 
among Member States be speeded up by the 
creation of the EURO-zone? On one level the 
answer is affirmative, to the extent that the single 
currency will be growth and trade-inducing which 
should boost employment in Member States. This, 
in turn, should (providing the political will 
prevails) contribute to falling Public Sector Deficits 
in Member States. However, such prospects also 
depend on a future strong EURO in order to avoid 
increasing interest rates, which would be 
detrimental to growth. Therefore, it is difficult to 
avoid the conclusion, which seems to be that 
reached by the UK Government, that what matters 
most is the political and economic conviction to see 
the convergence process through to the end, with or 
without the EURO. 
3. The implications of Economic Convergence 
for Labour Markets 
The Amsterdam Treaty placed employment policy 
at the very heart of European economic policy. 
The Treaty embraced a legal basis for Community 
action to form "Guidelines for Employment" which 
in time should be specified to individual national 
plans. A "target-orientated" approach to 
employment will form the basis of community 
monitoring and periodic review. Among the many 
measures within the Treaty for reducing 
employment, four key priorities have been 
identified in order to reduce the obstacles to 
employment which currently exist within European 
labour markets, namely: 
• A reduction in the social charges on low 
wages. Social charges (unemployment 
insurance, sickness benefit etc) account for 
35% of the labour costs within the EU. In the 
US the figure is 22%, whilst in Japan it is 18%. 
There is also substantial variation within 
Europe, with some nations such as France and 
Spain at the top of the scale (38% and 36% 
respectively) and others such as the UK at the 
bottom end (26%) 
• A second priority identified by the 
Commission is to reduce the amount of red 
tape and bureaucracy associated with setting 
up businesses. Compared with counterparts in 
America, the average UK or French business 
start-up takes longer, costs more, and is beset 
by numerous administrative procedures and 
hurdles, all of which mitigate against business 
activity. 
It is true that the UK has more than other EU 
nations, relaxed the level of bureaucracy 
associated with new business start-ups. It has 
also gone further in terms of its approach to 
recruitment and redundancy in an attempt to 
encourage greater flexibility within the 
workforce. This, of course, is a controversial 
issue. As public finances become tighter, 
which is one of the key targets of economic 
convergence, greater pressure will develop to 
extend this trend further; 
• A key challenge for the European labour 
market, and one which may prove to be the 
most stubborn obstacle to real convergence is 
the requirement to encourage greater 
geographical mobility in the European 
workforce. Currently only 3% of Europeans 
live in an EU country other than that in which 
they were born. Within the contemporary 
labour market, employees will require to be 
flexible both in terms of what they work at and 
where they work. This will obviously entail a 
radical re-appraisal of EU systems of 
education, vocational training and life-long 
learning. Central to this should be the 
encouragement amongst UK students and 
others to participate in EU exchange schemes 
such as Socrates and Leonardo in which 
language skills are strongly emphasised. Of 
course, such enhanced labour mobility 
opportunities within a European context may 
be hindered by lack of progress on tax 
harmonisation and social security systems. 
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• The fourth key objective is support for 
Lifelong Learning involving yet higher 
participation levels in Higher and Further 
Education and at the same time re-skilling and 
retraining opportunities for a flexible 
workforce. 
4. The EURO and greater wage and price 
transparency 
A widely-held view is that the creation of the 
EURO will make wage and price differences within 
the EMU more transparent than was previously the 
case. As a consequence of this greater 
transparency, wage (and price) differences will 
have to more accurately reflect differences in 
productivity between Member States. 
This is a challenge for policy-makers and not least 
for trade unionists. Member States within the 
EURO area where wages are below the EU average 
cannot expect wage levels to increase dramatically 
without the consequence of higher unemployment. 
This will only be achieved over time as a result of 
improved labour productivity to a level close or 
above the current EU average. 
The Amsterdam Treaty laid much emphasis on the 
enhanced competitiveness of EU economies within 
a globalised marketplace. Productivity increases 
play a central part in this process. Between 1974 
and 1997-98 the growth of labour productivity 
averaged at a stable rate of 2% year-on-year. This 
was above the equivalent for both the US and the 
Japanese economies (at 0.7% pa and 1.9% pa 
respectively). Despite this, a dominant aspect of 
EU economic performance over this period was its 
poor employment growth and level, again 
compared with US and Japanese. 
By 1997-98, the extent of EU Non-Employment 
was severe (18 million), representing 10.7% of the 
total Civilian Labour Force. From the mid-1970s 
on there has in fact been a five-fold increase in the 
unemployment rate as well as a very low ratio of 
effectively employed persons with respect to the 
working-age population. This so-called 
Employment Rate reduced from 67% in 1961 to 
approximately 60% currently. This compares 
unfavourably with rates of 70+% in the US and 
Japan. This significant decline is not solely 
explained by the impact of unemployment (its 
inverse). Explanations have to be sought 
elsewhere. 
If greater labour market flexibility is achieved, the 
EU estimates that, in addition to the further likely 
increase in female participation, Employment 
Levels could again reach those levels witnessed in 
the early 1960s. It should, of course, be noted that 
the current (approximately) 60% Employment Rate 
actually corresponds to a rate of 55% in terms of 
full-time equivalent (FTE) as a result of the impact 
of part-time employment within the total. 
The combined effects of Globalisation, the 
(permanent) impact of new technologies and the 
importance of the so-called knowledge-Economy 
within the EU context emphasises more than ever 
the importance of modern up-to-date training 
policies and programmes on the part of Member 
States. It has been estimated by EU economists 
that as much as 40% of the current total EU 
unemployed labour force can be referred to as 
cyclically unemployed (as opposed to structurally 
unemployed). These workers could, therefore, re-
enter the active workforce with relatively little re-
training, although there will undoubtedly be sector-
specific bottlenecks preventing such a transition. 
5. Implications of other EU Labour Market 
Policies (Social Charter and Minimum 
Wage Legislation) 
Paque (1997 P113) has argued "most 
elements of the Welfare State lead to an increase in 
labour costs, because collective bargains are 
unlikely to fully trade off wages for social benefits. 
Hence social harmonisation on a relatively high 
level is most likely to narrow the gap in wage costs 
between the centre of the Community and its 
periphery (Ireland, Scotland, Southern Italy, 
Portugal and Greece) and to widen unemployment 
rates " He goes on to argue that this would 
lead to a perverse outcome, one in which the inter-
regional structure of wages would become more 
"equal" but the structure of unemployment more 
"unequal". This, in turn, will require a 
reinforcement of Community financed regional 
policy (eg EU Structural Funds). Put crudely, the 
richer countries (and Regions) of Europe will have 
to pay for this greater harmonisation of social 
policy by funding a higher level of fiscal transfers 
to the poorer countries (and Regions) of the 
Community. This would apply to a far greater 
extent than in the past under mainstream regional 
aid programmes. 
This will be the real test for the EU, namely 
whether individual Member States can arrive at a 
"fiscal redistributionist" consensus, when 
national and/or regional identify is strong in most 
Member States. Paque (PI 15) makes the telling 
point that ... "Such a Fiscal Federalist system is 
likely to share the same fate it works as long as 
it is hardly needed - that is when income 
differentials are minimum and is simply swamped 
when income differentials become substantial".... 
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Comparisons of GDP per capita levels across EU 
Member States indicate that this may be a major 
obstacle to real progress in the harmonisation of 
policies in this sphere. Recent figures suggest that 
per capita income in the 2 richest EU countries 
Germany (pre-unification) and Denmark was more 
than 30% above the EU average. Per capita 
income within the three poorest EU countries 
Spain, Greece and Portugal was more than 40% (in 
Portugal's case 70%) below that average. 
European labour markets are significantly varied 
on a number of different aspects. Such differences 
can be subsumed under the heading Regulation. 
Within the EU, the UK is the least regulated 
Member State and in recent years has become 
broadly comparable with the US and Japan. 
Siebert (1997) has characterised these differences 
in the Regulatory environment under the following 
headings: 
• Existence of minimum wage legislation 
• Provision for extending collective wage 
agreements 
• The existence of statutory works councils 
• Strictness of dismissals laws (eg notice periods 
and severance pay rules) 
• Restrictions on temporary work agencies 
• Restrictions on working hours 
• The existence of statutory paid vacations 
For a range of EU Member States he conducted an 
analysis of the impact of the above regulatory 
differences using econometric analysis on a set of 
employment 'outputs', namely; labour force, self-
employment, unemployment, employment growth, 
part-time and temporary work opportunities, GDP 
per capita, hourly compensation, growth in 
Earnings, and income distribution. Limited space 
prevents a full discussion of the findings, but what 
is clear is that the EU is divided into two camps -
the regulated and the de-regulated. To focus on 
particular indicators, the author found that the more 
regulated a Member State, the slower is its growth 
in private sector employment, and the lower is the 
country's level of average earnings/income. 
Secondly, there is no empirical evidence to link the 
Regulation Index and Income Inequality. Thirdly, 
as regards unemployment inequality, the author 
found that unskilled relative unemployment has 
increased (especially during the 1980s) in the 4 
countries examined (the UK, the USA, France and 
West Germany) and that there was no clear 
advantage ascribed to the more regulated Member 
States such as West Germany or France. The 
period covered in this study was up to the mid 
1990s. 
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A specific conclusion regarding the Minimum 
Wage aspect was based on a correlation of 
minimum wage legislation and whether such 
legislation "bites" - i.e. the ratio of the minimum to 
manual worker wages in industry. The so-called 
'minimum wage bite' is least in such countries as 
Spain and the US at around 40% and strongest in 
Belgium, France and Portugal at approximately 
70% (see Table 3). 
The impact of the EURO (and more precisely 
EMU) to such trends is difficult to gauge. The 
need for structural reform of EU labour markets 
has already been mentioned (see also IMF 1998). 
Where the currency element will make a difference 
is to the extent that a single currency across the EU 
area will mean that Member States no longer have 
recourse to currency adjustments in order to 
smooth out market inflexibilities. Indeed, without 
the opportunity for currency adjustments, the need 
will be even greater for more flexible labour 
markets in order to allow countries to adjust to 
external shocks, particularly asymmetric shocks. 
Of course, the structural bottlenecks which inflict 
the EU are multi-faceted - social benefit systems 
which yield poor incentives to work, tax systems 
which disincentivise workers, and as we have 
discerned above, excessive labour market 
regulation. A difficult task ahead will involve 
policies to decouple wage behaviour from local 
(i.e. national) labour market conditions. Recently, 
the EU has introduced labour market surveillance 
procedures designed to monitor annually national 
employment policies and to assess individual 
national performance in this regard. For example, 
particular attention will be given to the effects of 
such policies as the reduction in the working week 
in order to ensure that this is implemented flexibly 
and to prevent an increase in employers' labour 
costs. Leading EU trade unionists have recognised 
the pragmatism of such an approach, whilst 
recognising the limitation of existing knowledge on 
these effects especially in relation to a Sector-by-
Sector analysis (Coldrick, 1997; see also OECD, 
1997). 
IMPACTS ON SCOTTISH LABOUR 
MARKET 
The following section tries to draw out certain 
possible Gains and Losses which might accrue to 
the Scottish Labour Market in relation to the 
impact of the EURO, whether Sterling joins or not. 
There are of course, certain distinguishing features 
of the Scottish Economy and Labour Market which 
a longer paper could highlight in greater depth. 
Suffice here to list some of these features as 
follows: 
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• There is a heavier dependence on the part of 
the Scottish economy compared with the rest 
of the UK to foreign inward investment. The 
sectoral and country breakdowns of such 
investments are of crucial importance as far as 
the impact of the EURO is concerned (see 
Hood in Peat and Boyle 1999). 
Scotland attracts a higher share of inward 
investment than its relative share of UK GDP 
might predict. Hood (P44) argues that over the 
period 1991-1997 this averaged between 15% 
and 20% of the UK's annual total 
(manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
combined). 
The Sectoral breakdown of such inward 
investment is also of relevance. Foreign 
companies are especially prominent in Food 
and Drink, Chemicals and Petroleum Products 
and Electrical and Electronic Products. Of 
course, as Hood points out, electronics has 
been the pre-eminent sector as far as 
manufacturing inward investment is 
concerned, with in excess of 200 different 
manufacturing companies employing 46,000 
people (1 in 7 Scottish manufacturing 
employment) and 80% of output exported. A 
further 400 software and services companies 
employ 15,000 people in Scodand. In total, 
64% of all employment in electronics 
manufacturing in Scotland is based in the 
subsidiaries of multi-national enterprises of 
which 51% are in US MNE's. 
• There is a continuing concentration of Scottish 
exports among a small range of products or 
sectors. The 1999 Annual Report of the 
Scottish Council for Development and 
Industry (SCDI) indicated that 3 sectors -
Whisky (11%), Electronics (58%) and 
Chemicals (9%) - accounted for more than 
75% of Scotland's total exports during 1999. 
Since a large proportion of these sectors are 
controlled by overseas institutions (especially 
in Electronics), this leaves the Scottish 
economy and labour markets particularly 
vulnerable to investment policies in such 
companies. To the extent that a large 
proportion of these companies have origins 
outwith Europe (North America and Asia-
Pacific - 28% and 10% of all foreign direct 
investment projects respectively in 1997) 
compared with 17% for Europe, suggests that 
the impact of Sterling's membership of the 
EURO will be hard to predict. The other side 
of this coin is the point that based on these 
figures the single currency, as such, cannot be 
expected to yield significant inward 
investment benefits from other EU countries 
given the dominance to date of non-EU inward 
projects. 
• To counter this, the EU, according to the SCDI 
Report increased its share of Scotland's total 
exports - 63% in 1999 (compared to 61% in 
1998). The top 3 export markets for Scottish 
products during 1999 were: France (27%), 
Germany (18%) and North America (11%). 
Sterling's appreciation against the EURO 
during 1999 has according to the Report, 
produced a "plateau" effect in Scottish exports. 
• Of crucial importance to the Scottish economy 
is the Financial and Business Services Sector 
(Banking, Insurance, Legal, Accounting etc) 
which accounts for approximately 19% of the 
total Scottish GDP and 250,000 in 
employment (Wood in Peat and Boyle op cit). 
Fund management and insurance are of 
particular significance with the former being 
the key centre outside London. Wood (ibid) 
also shows that Financial and Business 
Services account for approximately 10% of 
total employment within Scodand and 
together provided nearly 50% of all new jobs 
created in Scotland between 1985 and 1997. 
As far as the EURO is concerned, this sector 
can be expected to benefit from Sterling's 
membership. This is so because European 
wide Mergers and Acquisitions (M & A) 
activity during 1999 showed an upward trend. 
This is likely to continue in response to the 
lower transactions costs of the single currendy 
in the financing of European-wide mergers. 
Edinburgh, as a major fund management 
centre, could be a major beneficiary of such 
trends. 
In the light of this, the Scottish Labour Market 
would be affected in quite contradictory ways as a 
consequence of Sterling's membership of the 
EURO. Some of these effects would not be unique 
to the Scottish Economy but would be UK-wide. A 
key question for the Scottish Economy is whether 
the EU, (if the EURO-Zone is to succeed), can be 
expected to offset or compensate for some of the 
potential losses that may occur if there is a decline 
in Foreign Inward Investment into the UK and 
Scotland. The latter would particularly affect the 
Scottish Economy with its heavier reliance on 
Inward Investment. 
The other side of this issue is that such Inward 
Investment would probably continue to take place 
anyway on its previous scale, given that the EURO 
would simply replace Sterling as the appropriate 
currency for trading purposes on the part of US 
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and other investors. The key issue, therefore is 
whether the EURO will over the long run be more 
stable than Sterling (see Table 4). 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has attempted to consider some of the 
possible effects of the creation of the EURO on the 
Scottish Economy and Labour Market. Although 
tentative, it has highlighted some of the conflicting 
possible scenarios open to the Scottish Economy as 
a consequence of the EURO. It is impossible to be 
prescriptive as to the likely effects on the Scottish 
Labour Market since for every gain to be derived 
from membership of the EURO there appears to be 
a corresponding loss. Some particular sections of 
the Scottish Economy, for example electronics and 
computers given their heavy dependence on non-
EU investment may be adversely affected by a 
decision to join the EURO. However, a clear 
conclusion of this paper is that it is not the EURO 
per se which matters in this debate, but whether or 
not the much-heralded gains of the EURO in terms 
of macro-economic convergence and more flexible 
labour and product markets will be realised. 
Moreover, there is a clear need for economists and 
policy-makers to carefully monitor such trends as 
the UK prepares for its referendum on the EURO in 
2001 and possible membership in 2002/3. 
Additionally, focus should be directed to 
examining the potential effects on a Sector-by-
Sector basis, since the precise configuration of 
these possible gains and losses may affect different 
sectors of the Scottish Economy differently. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE I 
Nominal long-term interest rates - Annual data 
Dec.97 - Nov.98 
EU15 
EUR-11 
B 
DK 
D 
EL 
E 
FR 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
A 
P 
FIN 
S 
UK 
% 
5,1 
4,8 
4,9 
5,1 
4,7 
8,8 
5,0 
4,8 
4,9 
5,0 
4,8 
4,7 
4,8 
5,0 
4,9 
5,1 
6.2 
Source: Eurostat, November 1999 
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TABLE 2 
euro-zone 
1.6 
euro-zone 
9.8 
euro-zone 
73.7 
euro-zone 
-2.0 
EU15 
1.1 
BU15 
9.0 
EU15 
69.3 
EU15 
-1.5 
B 
1.0 
B 
8.7 
B 
118.2 
B 
-0.9 
DK 
1.9 
DK 
DK 
58.0 
DK 
1.0 
D 
0.5 
D 
9.1 
D 
61.1 
D 
-2.0 
Harmonised indices of consumer prices 
EL 
2.4 
E 
2.1 
FR 
0.5 
IRL 
2.3 
I 
1.6 
L 
0.9 
Harmonised unemployment rates 
EL E 
15.4 
FR 
10.5 
IRL 
6.0 
I L 
2.6 
General government gross debt (total in % of GDP) 
EL 
106.3 
E 
65.1 
FR 
58.8 
IRL 
49.5 
I 
118.7 
L 
6.9 
General government deficit (total in % of GDP) 
EL 
-2.5 
E 
-1.7 
FR 
-2.9 
IRL 
2.4 
I 
-2.7 
L 
2.5 
N 
2 
N 
N 
67 
N 
-0 
Source: Eurostat, November 1999 
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TABLE3 
Wage Regulating Framework 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
UK* 
Japan 
USA 
Minimum wage (ratio to manual wages in industry, 1993) 
Yes (69%) 
No 
Yes (73%) 
No 
Yes (57%) 
No 
No 
Yes (60%) 
Yes (70%) 
Yes (40%) 
No 
No - except for agriculture 
Yes (53%) 
Yes (37%) 
* This data obviously precedes the UK's recent adoption of the Minimum Wage. 
Source: Adapted from Siebert (1997, p 230) 
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TABLE 4 THE 
STERLING 
'JW 
GAINS (+) 
1. CONVERGENCE BENEFITS 
(LOW INFLATION) 
(FALLING PUBLIC SECTOR DEFICIT) 
(CURRENCY STABILITY) 
(LOWER INTEREST RATES) 
2. FINANCIAL SECTOR BENEFITS 
(SINGLE CAPITAL MARKET GAINS) 
(STRONG MERGERS& ACQUISITIONS EFFECTS -
BENEFITS 
TO SCOTLAND) 
LOSSES (-) 
1. POSSIBILITY OF 'WEAK' EURO 
(INTEREST RATES INCREASE) 
2. PUBLIC SECTOR DEFICITS INCREASE 
(TO FINANCE INTER-REGIONAL TRANSFERS) 
3. INFLEXIBLE EU LABOUR MARKETS 
(HIGH NON-WAGE COSTS) 
(LOW EMPLOYMENT GROWTH) 
(INCOME DISTRIBUTION EFFECTS) 
4. SECTORAL EFFECTS 
(SCOTLAND, PARICULARLY VULNERABLE) 
5. POSSIBLE STERLING DEVALUATION ON ENTRY 
(INFLATIONARY EFFECTS) 
i-POSSIBLE GAINS AND LOSSES 
STERL 
'OU 
GAINS (+) 
1. BENEFITS OF UK DE-R 
(FLEXIBLE LABOUR M 
(FALLING TAXES) 
(INCREASED BUSINES 
2. USE OF CURRENCY AS 
(INDEPENDENCE FROM 
(HIGH EXPORT COMPE 
3. SAFE HAVEN BENEFIT 
(HIGH LEVEL OF INW 
ESPECIALLY FROM US 
(LOW NON-WAGE COS 
LOSSES (-) 
1. STRONG EURO-ZONE 
(LOSS OF BENEFITS F 
(LOSS OF STRONG IN 
2. STRONG EURO 
(STERLING MARGINA 
FOR 
